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19 OCT 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Dr. Brzezinski,
18 October 1978

25X1

[redacted]

3. I covered the NFIP budget and how well I thought we did. Brzezinski acknowledged that.

4. I asked about the Mondale meeting. He said that Aaron was present for it and he didn't have any feedback. I didn't have time to check with Aaron, particularly since I have a meeting with the Vice President scheduled.

5. I delivered the follow-up memo on CTB.

6. He said there was nothing he knew to the Newsweek report on Egyptian/Israeli intelligence cooperation.

7. I explained the [redacted] report situation.

[redacted]

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[redacted]

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[redacted]

10. I delivered a memo on recent security actions.

11. There was no new news on the prisoner exchanges.

[redacted]

13. Brzezinski suggested to me before I even raised it that we take up the [redacted] issue with the President at the conclusion of my next oral briefing for him. I should have a good statement of the benefits to be derived from [redacted]

14. I briefed him on the NIO for Warning.

15. I didn't get to any of the other items. I delivered a private memo on a personnel issue. (Returned to DDA by EA/DCI.)

16. Brzezinski raised with me his impression that the usefulness of the PDB had dropped some. He had no indication that the President felt this way. He feels we are doing too much gisting of cables and not adding enough additional information or insights to them. He expects something a little more interpretive from us.

a. Beyond this, he expects something a little more startling or secretive. He has the feeling too much is virtually in the public domain. He mentioned, for instance, what we are getting out of [redacted] 25X1

b. He'd like to see more on the Soviet Union, its plans and policies, as opposed to so much on Africa. He commended today's item on the succession in the Soviet Union.

c. In short, he thinks of the PDB as an opportunity to stir the President to think about significant issues more than to substitute for forwarding cables to him.

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d. He thought we should get someone like Sam Huntington who was detached from the scene to review some PDBs and give us some suggestions. Beyond that, he suggests that Bob Bowie might want to bring Huntington aboard as a consultant.

e. I took advantage of this opportunity to mention to him that on Tuesday I had tried to do a couple of more medium term interpretive items in my oral briefing, e.g., [redacted] because I too had felt a need to utilize these opportunities to stimulate the President to think of particular forthcoming problems. He said his reaction to those items in the oral briefing was very good and thought we should do more of it. I pointed out I could put some of those things in the PDB, though the ones which were somewhat speculative and personal opinions I would prefer to use in the oral briefings because even with the limited distribution of the PDB somebody would probably file an objection if I took too speculative an attack. (Be sure this item reaches Bob Bowie, [redacted] 25X1

f. Brzezinski pointed out the unexcelled opportunity we have to be of value to the President here through this medium of the PDB. His remarks were very constructive in tone, not intended to be critical. He apparently has detected, he thinks, a little shift in tenor in the PDB, plus I think he sees the value to the President of outside stimulus from different directions and we have that opportunity.

STANSFIELD TURNER
Director

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